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The EU Global Strategy is crystal clear on 
the EU’s political level of ambition yet 
remarkably silent on the corresponding 
military level of ambition. But strategy 
without capabilities is just a 
hallucination. Recent developments in 
the EU make it possible, however, for the 
Member States to agree on an 
appropriate and affordable military level 
of ambition. The aim: to conduct 
autonomous crisis management 
operations and to contribute substantially 
to territorial defence within the NATO 
framework. We should not forget that the 
European countries have the primary 
responsibility for the territorial defence of 
their own continent.  
 
The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) defines a 
political level of ambition, in order to defend the 
EU’s vital interests: our security, prosperity and 
democracy. It also introduces strategic 
autonomy as an objective. Clearly, the aim is for 
the EU to be a global actor in security as well as 
defence. 
But the EUGS refers only in passing to 
European defence in the full meaning of the 
term. The Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) is mostly portrayed as one of the 
elements of the Union’s integrated approach. 
Nothing wrong with that: the military is indeed 
but the catalyst that in some circumstances is 
necessary to achieve the desired political 
objectives. If the references to defence remain 
too vague, however, and are not afterwards 
translated into required military capabilities, the 
EU will not achieve real actorness in defence. 
Strategic autonomy requires soft as well as hard 
power.  
The reluctance to do what is necessary to 
achieve a meaningful military level of ambition 
is the weakest link in the implementation of the 
EUGS, and stops the EU from putting into 
practice a fully integrated approach, and from 
achieving real strategic autonomy. How to 
overcome this reluctance?      
MORE THAN PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS   
At the time of the presentation of the EUGS in 
June 2016, many initially saw the question for a 
detailed military level of ambition as 
inconvenient. Since then, however, the EU has 
in rapid tempo created a wholes series of 
instruments to facilitate military capability 
development, from Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO) and the Coordinated 
Annual Review on Defence (CARD) to the 
European Defence Fund (EDF). There is today 
more union in defence than ever before. As we 
know now how we can generate the required 
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capabilities, we can focus on the question of 
which capabilities we need, in order to do what. 
For today’s world and for the future – Chinese 
strategy, for example, has a time horizon of 
2049.  
 
The origins of the CSDP can be found in the 
1992 Petersberg Declaration by the Western 
European Union (WEU). Although the so-called 
Petersberg Tasks, which were later incorporated 
into the Treaty on European Union, did 
theoretically include peace-making (which we 
would now call peace enforcement), the original 
emphasis clearly was on peacekeeping. If that 
was understandable when seen in the context of 
the 1990s, when the WEU and then the EU first 
began to develop an autonomous defence 
policy, there is no reason why so many still 
interpret the CSDP in a reductive manner. The 
EU is engaging in crisis management operations, 
in capacity-building, in border security, in 
defending against hybrid threats. Furthermore, 
the Lisbon Treaty introduced a Solidarity Clause 
and a Mutual Assistance Clause. The EU is 
protecting citizens at home and abroad. The idea 
that one can ring-fence the CSDP and limit it to 
peacekeeping has obviously been completely 
overtaken by events.  
 
Real strategic autonomy requires us to leave the 
status quo behind and to take a fresh look at 
both pillars of defence: crisis management and 
territorial defence.    
 
THE SCOPE OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT  
Even the US expects the EU to achieve 
autonomy in crisis management. Both George W. 
Bush and Barack Obama sent us the same 
message: “Sometimes, dear friends, you will be 
on your own”. The same goes for Donald Trump 
– he just words it even more succinctly. One of 
the main reasons is that for the US China is now 
the main challenger, and Asia the main theatre.  
The EU thus needs to engage responsibly in all 
conflicts in which European interests are more at 
stake than those of the US. This in turn means 
that Europe needs the capabilities required to 
conduct crisis management operations across the 
spectrum, whenever a crisis emerges, and for as 
long as it takes to achieve the desired political 
end-state. If necessary, the EU must be able to 
address multiple crises at the same time. The 
EUGS introduces a geographic priority: the EU 
should assume responsibility first and foremost in 
its broad neighbourhood (“in the east stretching 
into Central Asia, and to the south down to 
Central Africa”). The EUGS also mentions the 
vital importance of free access to the global 
commons, however. This is a worldwide 
challenge, hence the CSDP should also be able to 
operate worldwide. Not to become the world’s 
policeman, but to be able to defend our vital 
interests whenever and wherever they are 
threatened. 
 
In certain cases, Europeans may still contribute 
to crisis management operations initiated and led 
by the US, and vice versa. Indeed, NATO can 
also conduct crisis management operations, in 
addition to ensuring collective defence. But the 
US sees NATO more as a “supporting agency” 
to generate coalitions of the willing for the 
operations that Washington wants to undertake. 
The general rule clearly has become that overall 
autonomy in crisis management is a prerequisite 
on both sides of the Atlantic. The US has realised 
that a quarter century ago – it’s about time that 
we do too. 
 
 CAPABILITIES FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT    
History has shown that one should never model 
one’s capabilities on those needed for the last 
war – but one can draw lessons from previous 
conflicts.  
 
When the civil war in former Yugoslavia 
erupted, the ambition to act was there, but 
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initially the means were lacking. Afterwards the 
EU translated the required capabilities for such a 
scenario into the Helsinki Headline Goal: a 
quickly deployable army corps, supported by a 
tactical air force equipped with precision-guided 
munitions. In terms of command and control, 
that implied a civilian-military headquarters at 
the strategic level, a force headquarters to 
conduct the operation in theatre, and a 
combined air operations centre. Geographically, 
the theatre of operations in former Yugoslavia 
was relatively limited, and the various 
adversaries each possessed but limited military 
capacity, hence there was no need for large 
reserves, though of course the long duration of 
the deployment meant that troops needed to be 
rotated. 
In Libya in 2011, European states once again 
wanted to take the lead, but two decades after 
the start of the war in former Yugoslavia the EU 
still proved unable to act autonomously. 
Remarkably, no comprehensive approach was 
adopted to address the crisis. Action was limited 
to the first phase of a military intervention: 
neutralising the adversary military through air 
attack. No civilian-military headquarters was 
activated at the strategic level. The air campaign 
required a combined air operations centre, 
significant stocks of precision-guided munitions, 
air-to-air refuelling, and intelligence on the 
theatre of operations. Without appealing to 
NATO and the US, the after all rather limited 
military objectives could not have been 
achieved.  
 
In the campaign in Iraq and Syria, the European 
countries continue to contribute in full 
solidarity, through the US-led coalition. While it 
is too early to draw definite conclusions from 
this conflict, one lesson already stands out: given 
the presence of sophisticated Russian air 
defence systems, Europe urgently needs the 
capacity to deploy the next generation fighter 
aircraft.  
As conflicts tend to endure over many years and 
even decades, in various regions, while new 
threats (such as hybrid challenges and cyber-
attacks) have emerged, it has become ever more 
likely that in the future Europe will have to 
address several large-scale conflicts simultaneously, 
and might even be forced to deploy reserve 
units to reinforce ongoing operations. The EU 
will not be able to cope if too many actors 
continue to interpret the Headline Goal in a 
fragmented way, as a composite of brigades and 
battalions, which they can only imagine to be 
deployed piecemeal, on small-scale and low-risk 
operations, against militarily inferior opponents 
not too far from Europe. Such deployments will 
seldom achieve the desired strategic effect. 
 
Today, strategic autonomy in crisis management 
requires several immediately deployable army 
corps, and equivalent air and naval forces, that 
can be projected without geographic limits and 
until the desired political end-state has been 
achieved. These forces must possess sufficient 
intelligence, be protected against cyber-attacks, 
and be able to call upon pre-identified reserves. 
A strategic-level military headquarters must be 
available for immediate activation, without any 
preconditions or limitations, hence it must be 
permanent. Success depends on preventive 
action and quick deployment into theatre, which 
requires that the operational plans are elaborated 
beforehand and that troops are kept in a 
sufficient state of readiness. On top of it all, a 
civilian-military strategic headquarters must 
ensure an integrated approach. 
  
COLLECTIVE DEFENCE  
Article 5 is NATO’s raison d’être. The collective 
defence guarantee obviously is vital for Europe 
– but is it still for the US? The answer is yes. 
The strategic focus of the US is indeed on 
China, the only actor that could equal or even 
overtake the US in terms of power. Russia has a 
lot of nuisance power, but can no longer 
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threaten US predominance. But in this strategic 
competition, an old strategic truth remains valid: 
the power that has Europe on its side, has the 
potential to dominate world affairs. China and 
Russia also know this, hence their attempts to 
gain influence and/or to divide and subvert the 
EU and NATO. For the US this means that 
preventing its links with Europe from being cut 
or, worse, Europe changing sides, is a matter of 
national security. NATO remains vital to both 
Europe and the US.  
 
However, the European interest obviously is 
more directly at stake, because European 
territory is more directly threatened than the 
American homeland. To keep NATO relevant 
and resilient, a new transatlantic equilibrium is 
necessary, including in the area of collective 
defence. This surpasses the debate on burden-
sharing. It’s not just about which % of GDP 
allies need to spend on defence, but about which 
degree of autonomy allies on either side of the 
Atlantic need, which military capabilities that 
requires and, as importantly, which military 
planning can deliver them.  
 
A new equilibrium entails first of all that the 
European countries need a sufficient degree of 
autonomy to allow them to take charge of crisis 
management each time their interests are more 
at stake than those of the US. But in addition it 
entails that the European members of NATO, 
who with the US and Canada are “co-
responsible” for collective defence, must assume 
“first responsibility” for their own territorial 
defence, and provide the major share of the 
military capabilities that this requires. In 
budgetary terms this does not just mean that the 
Europeans must contribute more than 50% of 
the defence expenditure dedicated to the 
defence of Europe – that they are doing already. 
The challenge is to achieve the same level of 
cost-effectiveness as the US in its defence spending. 
  
MILITARY PLANNING  
The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) 
constantly recalibrates the military requirements 
in view of the changing threat. The requirements 
for NATO as a whole are translated into targets 
for every individual Ally. However, no provision 
is made for a subgroup, such as the European 
Allies and partners, to collectively acquire all 
capabilities required to allow them to act 
autonomously in certain scenarios. If it is not 
planned for, it will not happen by accident. To 
the contrary, the legacy of the Cold War, during 
which the US contributed the strategic enablers 
and the Europeans Allies focused almost 
exclusively on tactical assets, can be felt to this 
day.  
 
It is up to the EU Member States to align their 
national defence planning in order to achieve 
the capability mix that will generate the desired 
European strategic autonomy within the overall 
NATO level of ambition. In CARD, the EU 
now has exactly the right instrument to provide 
top-down guidance at the highest level – Heads 
of State and Government – to both the EU 
institutions and the Member States. If CARD 
works, national defence plans will gradually, and 
in all sovereignty, end up being more and more 
aligned. Unnecessary duplications will disappear 
and strategic assets that individual countries 
cannot afford will be acquired collectively. This 
is the core of PESCO. Divergences will occur 
between the various national defence plans, in 
particular with regard to participation in individual 
capability projects. But within the binding 
framework of PESCO, flexibility is possible: not 
everybody needs to participate in every project 
at the same time, as long as nobody breaks 
overall solidarity by refusing to contribute. In 
short: the EU has the full toolbox to decide on 
an adequate military level of ambition and to 
generate the required capabilities, in an affordable 
manner. 
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CONCLUSION: FOR NATO, FIRST EUROPE 
Everybody remembers the “3 Ds”, Madeline 
Albright’s first reaction to European defence: no 
decoupling, no discrimination, no duplication. 
Today, we should keep in mind “3 Cs”: there is 
no competition, no contradiction and certainly 
no conspiracy. What we do have between the 
EU and NATO is a “4th C”: an agreement on 
complementarity. The failed experiment of the 
European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) 
in the early 1990s proved that establishing a 
European entity within NATO doesn’t work. 
Trying “simply” to merge two asymmetrical 
entities like the CSDP and NATO will not work 
either, but rather risks destabilising both. It is 
through the EU and alongside NATO that the 
Europeans can achieve strategic autonomy.  
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